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Protection of Attorney-Client Privilege in
Europe
Professor Tarn Spronken* and Jan Fermon**
1. INTRODUCTION
This article sets out the European perspective on attorney-client
privilege and confidentiality and is based on a presentation made at the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers' Fifth International
Conference held May 5th to 8th, 2008 in Amsterdam. The aim is to
provide a general overview of how attorney-client privilege is
constructed, protected, and perceived in Europe.
The first remark that has to be made is that in the absence of a
binding European regulation or statute, the protection of confidentiality
of communications between attorneys and clients is primarily a matter of
national law in the European states, whether belonging to the European
Union1 or to the larger Council of Europe 2 area.
In the national laws, the protection of confidentiality is assured
through very different mechanisms with different consequences as to the
scope and the degree of protection. In countries with a strong
Napoleonic tradition such as France or Belgium the emphasis is on
"professional secrecy." Violation of the obligation to professional
* Taru Spronken (Taru.Spronken@STRAFR.unimaas.nl) is professor of criminal
law and criminal procedure at the Maastricht University in The Netherlands. She is also
a practicing defense lawyer at the bar of Maastricht.
** Jan Fermon (jan.fermon@progresslaw.net) is completing, in the framework of
Ph.D. research at the Maastricht University, a comparative study on the protection of
confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients in criminal cases in five
EU countries. He is also criminal defense lawyer at the bar of Brussels, Belgium.
1. See Eurunion.org, European Union Offices, http://www.eurunion.org/eu/
index2.php?option=comcontent&do-pdf-l&id=57 (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (listing
the twenty-seven EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czek Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
2. See Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (stating
that the Council of Europe includes forty-seven member-states).
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secrecy by a lawyer is a criminal offence3 . The "right of non-disclosure"
is considered as an accessory to professional secrecy.4 Conversely, in
other countries, like the Netherlands, the emphasis is on the "right of
non-disclosure" explicitly protected by law.' In countries with an Anglo
Saxon common law tradition, the protection of confidentiality is seen as
part of a broader concept of "professional privilege," being a
fundamental principle of justice, that grants protection from disclosing
evidence and is seen as a right that attaches to the client and not to the
lawyer and so may only be waived by the client.6 In other jurisdictions,
the privilege is considered as belonging to the lawyer.7 According to this
difference in approach the lawyer-even without consent of the client-
will in some jurisdictions be able to waive the privilege.8
In some European countries like Belgium the protection of
confidentiality is strictly limited to independent advocates. In others like
the Netherlands in-company lawyers benefit fully from the privilege of
non-disclosure, in the same way as independent lawyers. 9
The European Court of Justice l (hereinafter ECJ) recognized the
existence of these differences in the following terms:
As far as the protection of... communications between lawyer and
client is concerned, it is apparent from the legal systems of the
member states that, although the principle of such protection is
generally recognized, its scope and the criteria for applying it
vary.... Whilst in some of the member states the protection against
disclosure afforded to... communications between lawyer and client
is based principally on a recognition of the very nature of the legal
3. BELGIUM CRIMINAL CODE, art. 458 (2000).
4. Ph. Traest & J. Meese, Het verschoningrecht naar Belgisch Recht, in
VERSCHONINGSRECHT IN HET STRAFRECHT VAN BELGIIR EN NEDERLAND (Wolf Legal
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2006).
5. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Wetboek van Strafvordering--"CCP"), art. 218
(1994); NETHERLANDS CODE OF CIVIL PROEDURE (Burgerlijk Wetboek), art. 191 (1992);
CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, art. 8:33 (1992).
6. Michael Cosgrave, Professional Secrecy, the position in England and Wales, in
THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN EUROPE 31-33 (Larcier, Brussels-Ghent 2003).
7. Georges Albert Dal, Le secret professionel de I'avocat en Belgique, in THE
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN EUROPE 7 (Larcier, Brussels-Ghent 2003).
8. This is also the case in the Netherlands because of the wording of Article 218 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article
8:33 of the Code of Administrative Procedure. See supra note 5.
9. Verordening op de praktijkuitoefening in dienstbetrekking van de Nederlandse
Orde van Advocaten (Directive on practice of in-house lawyers of the Dutch Bar
Association), Nov. 27 1996, Staatscourant 1996, 239, last amended on June 26, 2008,
Staatscourant 2008, 141.
10. The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities are based in Luxembourg. Both Courts have jurisdiction over conflicts
related to the interpretation and the implementation of the treaties establishing the
European Union.
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profession inasmuch as it contributes towards the maintenance of the
rule of law, in other member states the same protection is justified by
the more specific requirement (which, moreover, is also recognized
in the first-mentioned states) that the rights of the defence must be
respected.
1 I
On the other hand, the ECJ said in the same decision:
Community law, which derives from not only the economic but also
the legal interpenetration of the member states, must take into
account the principles and concepts common to the laws of those
states concerning the observance of confidentiality, in particular, as
regards certain communications between lawyer and client, that
confidentiality serves the requirements, the importance of which is
recognized in all of the member states, that any person must be able,
without constraint, to consult the lawyer whose profession entails the
giving of independent legal advice to all those in need of it ... 12
Protection of confidentiality of communications between lawyers and
clients is thus considered as part of "the principles and concepts common
to the laws of the (member) states."'' 3
We will further see that the European Court of Human Rights
(hereinafter ECtHR) has a similar approach, looking upon the matter as a
specific aspect of the right to a fair trial and the right to privacy protected
by Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter ECHR). 14 The protection of professional confidentiality, in
one form or another, is therefore a common feature of the national legal
systems, and in the countries members of the EU, as in the Council of
Europe member states.
The following paragraphs will focus on developments and case law
that is relevant on a Europe wide scale and, particularly, the case law of
the ECtHR established in relation to professional privilege. 5 The Court
of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the European
Communities have also developed some case law but less abundant than
the ECtHR and in relation to more peripheral aspects of the protection of
11. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Communities,
1982 E.C.R. 1575, 2 C.M.L.R. 264.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The European Court of Human Rights is an institution established in the
framework of the Council of Europe. The ECtHR has jurisdiction over violations of the
European Human Rights Convention.
15. See European Court of Human Rights, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) (displaying a database of all case
law of the European Court of Human Rights); European Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance, http://curia.europa.eu/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2008) (listing all case law of
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities).
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the confidentiality of lawyer client communications, such as in the recent
Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v. Commission case.1 6 At
stake in this case was whether communications between clients and in-
company lawyers could benefit from the protection of confidentiality in
relation to investigations by the European Commission into the way
companies apply the European competition rules.' 7 The CFI decided that
they could not.18 One of the reasons for the CFI to decide so was that
there is no text in European law on this matter and that practices vary
between member states.19
Before looking into the case law of the ECtHR however it is
necessary to briefly look into the texts.
II. EUROPEAN LAW AND INTERSTATE INSTRUMENTS OF EU-MEMBERS
STATES
Neither the EU treaties nor the ECHR refer explicitly to
professional privilege for lawyers, but there are other regulations, most
of them non-binding, that do contain provisions concerning professional
privilege.
The right of a person charged with a criminal offence to
communicate with defence counsel without hindrance is set forth within
the Council of Europe, in Article 93 of the-non binding-Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (annexed to Resolution
(73) 5 of the Committee of Ministers), which states that:
An untried prisoner shall be entitled, as soon as he is imprisoned, to
choose his legal representative, or shall be allowed to apply for free
legal aid where such aid is available, and to receive visits from his
legal adviser with a view to his defence and to prepare and hand to
him, and to receive, confidential instructions. At his request he shall
be given all necessary facilities for this purpose. In particular, he
shall be given the free assistance of an interpreter for all essential
contacts with the administration and for his defence. Interviews
between the prisoner and his legal adviser may be within sight but not
within hearing, either direct or indirect, of a police or institution
official.
In another context, only relating to proceedings at the ECtHR, the
European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings
16. Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros
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of the European Court of Human Rights, 20 which is binding in 35
member states provides in Article 3 para. 2:
As regards persons under detention, the exercise of this right [the
right 'to correspond freely with the Court'-see paragraph 1 of the
Article,TS &JF] shall in particular imply that:
c. such persons shall have the right to correspond, and consult out of
hearing of other persons, with a lawyer qualified to appear before the
courts of the country where they are detained in regard to an
application to the Court, or any proceedings resulting therefrom.
Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as far as
relevant, reads:
Article 41
Right to good administration
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and
bodies of the Union.
2. This right includes ... the right of every person to have access to
his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of
confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy....
Up to this point the Charter is however not binding. The Treaty of
Lisbon 21 amends Article 6 of the EU treaty to provide recognition of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter will however only be
binding when national governments implement EU law and Article 41
refers only to the handling of affairs by the institutions and bodies of the
Union. Furthermore it is not very clear whether Article 41 is protecting
privilege or stipulating exceptions to the right to access to the file. One
can therefore conclude that professional privilege and the protection of it
is not explicitly foreseen by European law, nor by EU-law nor by any
other legal instrument that is binding to European countries in the
framework of the Council of Europe.
20. European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the
European Court of Human Rights, CETS No.: 161.
21. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007/C
306/01. The Treaty of Lisbon is not yet ratified by all EU member states.
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III. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW
The ECtHR, however, did examine the question of confidentiality
and professional privilege protecting the lawyer-client communication
through various articles of the ECHR. More specifically the ECtHR
related the issue of professional privilege to Article 6,22 protecting the
right to a fair trial, and Article 8,23 protecting the right to privacy.
IV. PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE AND RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Article 6 guarantees different rights, some of which have been
considered as relevant to the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relation.
In a landmark decision on professional privilege, the case of Niemitz v.
Germany, the ECtHR states in general terms "where a lawyer is
involved, an encroachment on professional secrecy may have
repercussions on the proper administration of justice and hence on the
22. Article 6. Right to a fair trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be
given it free when the interests of justice so require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
23. Article 8. Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
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rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. ' '24 The Court refers to
Article 6 of the Convention as a whole and even broader to possible
repercussions of an infringement of professional privilege "on the proper
administration of justice.25
In other decisions the ECtHR refers to specific rights guaranteed by
Article 6. In order to be able to protect the confidentiality of lawyer
client communications a suspect must of course have the possibility to
contact freely a lawyer and vice versa. In the Golder v. UK case, the
applicant was detained and was not allowed to consult a lawyer in order
to seek advice to institute proceedings against a prison guard.26 The
applicant argued that this was a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR
which guarantees the right to have access to a court.27
The Court stated:
40 ... In these circumstances, Golder could justifiably wish to
consult a solicitor with a view to instituting legal proceedings. It was
not for the Home Secretary himself to appraise the prospects of the
action contemplated; it was for an independent and impartial court to
rule on any claim that might be brought. In declining to accord the
leave which had been requested, the Home Secretary failed to
respect, in the person of Golder, the right to go before a court as
guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1. 28
In the case of Schanenberger and Durmaz v. Switzerland, the
Prosecution stopped a letter sent by M. Sch6nenberger, a lawyer, to his
client M. Durmaz who was at that time in detention.29 Sch6nenberger
gave the advice in the letter to remain silent.3° M. Durmaz, ignorant
about the intervention of M. Sch6nenberger, appointed on the instigation
of the Prosecutor another lawyer.3'
To support their argument that the contested stopping of the letter
was necessary, the Swiss Government before the ECtHR relied in the
first place on the contents of the letter in issue: according to the
Government, it gave Mr. Durmaz advice relating to pending criminal
proceedings which was of such a nature as to jeopardize their proper
conduct. 32 The ECtHR rejects that argument by reaffirming the right of a
24. Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 251-B Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992).
25. Id.
26. Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524 (1975).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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suspect to remain silent, being a right enshrined in Article 6. Although
the applicant had only claimed a violation of Article 8, the ECtHR
decided that the interference was therefore not necessary in a democratic
society and in breach with Article 8.
In S. v. Switzerland, the ECtHR defined the right to communicate
confidentially with a lawyer as an aspect of Article 6, paragraph 3 (c) of
the Convention which protects the right of a suspect to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing.
35
The ECtHR considered that:
an accused's right to communicate with his advocate out of hearing
of a third person is part of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a
democratic society and follows from Article 6 para. 3(c) of the
Convention. If a lawyer were unable to confer with his client and
receive confidential instructions from him without such surveillance,
his assistance would lose much of its usefulness, whereas the
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and
effective.
36
In conclusion to this point it can be stated that the ECtHR has related the
protection of professional privilege to several rights protected by Article
6 of the Convention: access to a court when the suspect is hindered in his
37or her attempts to contact a lawyer, access to a lawyer of his or her own
choice when the contact with the lawyer is submitted to (excessive)
surveillance, 38 and monitoring and the right to legal assistance.
39
Surprisingly, the ECtHR has never examined the protection of
professional privilege as an essential condition to make the nemo tenetur
principle enshrined in Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2 ECHR effective.
Although the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself is
not explicitly mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the ECtHR
considers these rights generally-recognized international standards which
lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6.
According to the Court their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of
the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities thereby
contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the
33. Id.
34. Schonenberger and Durmaz, 137 Eur. H.R. Rep. 202.
35. S. v. Switzerland, App. No. 13325/87, 220 Eur. H.R. Rep. 670 (1991).
36. Id.
37. See Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524
(1975).
38. See S., 220 Eur. H.R. Rep. 670.
39. See Schonenberger and Durmaz, 137 Eur. H.R. Rep. 202.
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fulfillment of the aims of Article 6.40 The right not to incriminate
oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case
seeks to prove its case against the accused without resort to evidence
obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the
will of the accused. In this sense the right is closely linked to the
presumption of innocence contained in Article 6 para. 2 of the
Convention (Article 6-2). 4'
The principle that the burden of the proof is on the Prosecution and
that nobody has to contribute to his or her conviction requires that a
suspect can communicate freely and confidentially with his or her lawyer
and that whatever information given to the lawyer in whatever form,
orally or written, will be protected from scrutiny by the authorities.
Indeed if that would not be the case the suspect could be forced to
incriminate him or herself because an effective defence requires that all
information, even information that is unfavourable to his defence, should
be shared with the lawyer. If that information would not benefit
protection of confidentiality, the suspect would have to choose between
sharing the information in order to benefit from an effective defense or
benefit from the protection of the nemo tenetur principle. Such a choice
is incompatible with a fair trial in a democratic society. Confidentiality
of the lawyer-client communication is therefore essential. Until now no
case in which information collected in breach of professional privilege
and used by the prosecution against the suspect has yet been submitted to
the ECtHR.
V. PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE AND PRIVACY
The most important decisions in relation to the protection of
confidentiality in the lawyer-client relation taken by the ECtHR are
however based on Article 8 ECHR, protecting private life. In each of
these cases the ECtHR applies its traditional checklist in order to
establish whether there is a violation of the right to privacy:
42
o Was there an interference with the right to privacy?
o Was the interference in accordance with the law? This refers
not only to the existence of a legal regulation but also to the
quality of the law: foreseeability and accessibility.
o Did the interference pursue one of the legitimate aims
mentioned in Article 8 § 2 ECHR, e.g., was the interference
40. See, e.g., Funke v. France, App. No. 10828/84, 256 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1993);
Saunders v. U.K., App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1996).
41. See Funke, 256 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297; Saunders, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313.
42. See Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 (1990).
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necessary in a democratic society? Was there a pressing social
need? Was the requirement of proportionality met?
VI. INTERFERENCE IN PRIVATE LIFE APPLIES TO PROFESSIONAL
RELATIONS
In Niemietz v. Germany the discussion was whether Article 8
applied to business premises at all. 43 The German State argued that there
could be no question of an interference with the applicant's private life
because the searches at stake were conducted in his professional
premises, a lawyer's office." The ECtHR however interpreted the words
"private life" and "home" as including certain professional or business
activities or premises and considered that the protection afforded by
Article 8 extends to all business premises, including lawyer's offices.4 5
In later decisions the seizure or withholding of letters from clients to
lawyers and vice versa,46 seizure of hard disks,47 monitoring of lawyers
telephone lines48, were all considered as interferences with Article 8 of
the Convention.
In Campbell v. U.K., the ECtHR reiterated that communications
between lawyers and detained clients are in principle protected by Article
8 of the Convention.49
46. It is clearly in the general interest that any person who wishes to
consult a lawyer should be free to do so under conditions which
favour full and uninhibited discussion. It is for this reason that the
lawyer-client relationship is, in principle, privileged.... It was
considered, in the context of Article 6, that if a lawyer were unable to
confer with his client without such surveillance, and receive
confidential instructions from him his assistance would lose much of
its usefulness, whereas the Convention is intended to guarantee rights
that are practical and effective.
50
43. Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 251-B Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992).
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id. at 112.
46. See, e.g., Sch6nenberger and Durmaz v. Switzerland, App. No. 11368/85, 137
Eur. H.R. Rep. 202 (1988); Campbell v. U.K., App. No. 13590/88, 233 Eur. H.R. Rep.
137 (1993); Foxley v. U.K., App. No. 33274/96, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 637 (2000).
47. See, e.g., Sallinen v. Finland, App. No. 50882/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2007);
Smirnov v. Russia, App. No. 71362/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 71362/01 (2007); Wieser v.
Austria, App. No.74336/01, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54 (2008).
48. Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 (1999); Ass'n
for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.
62540/00; Aalmoes v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16269/02 (2004) (regarding the
decision as to admissibility).
49. Campbell, 233 Eur. H.R. Rep. 137.
50. Id. at 160-61, para. 46.
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The Court then decided that the protection of Article 8 extends to all
written communications between lawyers and detained clients:
48. ... [T]he Court sees no reason to distinguish between the
different categories of correspondence with lawyers which, whatever
their purpose, concern matters of a private and confidential character.
In principle, such letters are privileged under Article 8.51
The case law of the ECtHR is thus very clear: the confidential
relationship between lawyers and their clients is in principle protected by
the right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR.
However not all interferences with the right to privacy amount to a
breach of rights under Article 8. Interference can be legitimate under
some circumstances if in accordance with the law and necessary in a
democratic society.52  This is no different for the privileged
communications between lawyers and clients. The mere existence of
professional privilege is not-as such-an absolute obstacle to
interference with the right to privacy.53
VII. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND NECESSARY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY?
In order to decide whether the interference with communications
benefiting from the professional privilege has led to a violation of the
rights protected under Article 8, the ECtHR will apply first the set of
standards mentioned above. The ECtHR will, e.g., look at the
compatibility of the interference with the national law.5 4 It will examine
the quality of the law as to its foreseeability.55
Although the applicability in a specific case of professional
privilege does not make a formal difference, the ECtHR will take the
protection of professional privilege into consideration in different
ways-mainly by applying the general criteria in a strict way. For
example in Foxley v. UK. the seizure of letters from and to a lawyer was
considered not to be "in accordance with the law" because the seizure
went on for a short period after the Court order allowing to do so
expired.56 Furthermore, when the national law has some provision on the
51. Id. at 161, para. 48.
52. See, e.g., Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 105, para. 61; Foxley, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
647, para. 43.
53. See, e.g., Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 103, para. 38; Foxley, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
643-44, para. 31.
54. See, e.g., Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 114, para. 59; Foxley, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
642, paras. 24-26.
55. See, e.g., Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 114, para. 55; Foxley, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
644, para. 34.
56. Id. at 645, para. 35.
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protection of professional privilege, the ECtHR will interpret it in a strict
way.57 The Swiss law prohibits telephone tapping of a lawyer as a third
party (when the lawyer is not a suspect in the case).58 In Kopp v.
Switzerland, the government argued that the monitoring in this particular
case was not aimed at the applicant acting as a lawyer, but targeted in
fact his wife.59 It referred to the opinions of academic writers and the
Federal Court's case law to the effect that legal professional privilege
covered only matters connected with a lawyer's profession. 60  The
ECtHR rejected that argument, stating that it did not have to speculate on
the capacity in which Kopp was subject to surveillance and decided that
the Swiss law was not clear and therefore not foreseeable.6'
In Petri Sallinen v. Finland, where the lawyer was considered a
suspect himself, the ECtHR went even a step further stating:
... The Court concludes that, even if there could be said to be a
general legal basis for the measures provided for in Finnish law, the
absence of applicable regulations specifying with an appropriate
degree of precision the circumstances in which privileged material
could be subject to search and seizure deprived the applicants of the
minimum degree of protection to which they were entitled under the
rule of law in a democratic society.
62
And it decided also:
[T]he Court finds the text unclear as far as it concerns confidentiality.
The above-mentioned domestic law does not state with the requisite
clarity whether the notion of "pleading a case" covers only the
relationship between a lawyer and his or her clients in a particular
case or their relationship generally. The Court refers to a lawyer's
general obligation of professional secrecy and confidentiality. In this
respect the Court refers to the Recommendation of the Committee of
Ministers, according to which states should take all necessary
measures to ensure the respect of the confidentiality of the client-
lawyer relationship.
63
The Court does not reject in principle interferences with the
communication between lawyers and clients but demands first of all that
57. Cf Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 117, para. 75 (stating that "Swiss law, whether
written or unwritten, does not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of
exercise of the authorities' discretion in the matter.").
58. Id. at 114, para. 56.
59. Id. at 100, para. 31 (b).
60. Id. at 103, paras. 38-9.
61. Id. at 117, para. 75.
62. Sallinen v. Finland, App. No. 50882/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 372, para. 92
(2007).
63. Id. at 372, para. 87.
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the law should be particularly clear,64 interpreted by the national courts
in a way that is protective to the privilege, 65 and thirdly that special and
sufficient safeguards exist to protect the legal privilege. 66 If not, the
search and seizure is not "in accordance with the law" because the
qualitative requirements of the law are not met.67
In most cases however where the ECtHR came to the conclusion
that there had been a violation of Article 8, it decided that the
interference with the professional privilege was not "necessary in a
democratic society., 68 The very notion of "necessity in a democratic
society" implies an aspect of proportionality. The protection of private
life in this framework is therefore a relative one, as expressed in the case
of The Association for European Integration and Human Rights and
Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria.69 In this case, the ECtHR formulated general
standards that apply to any case in which phone tapping has been used
and that are not specific to communications protected by lawyer-client
confidentiality. 70  The ECtHR ruled that in the context of covert
measures of surveillance, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to
give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances
in which the authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and
potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life
and correspondence.71  In view of the risk of abuse intrinsic to any
system of secret surveillance, such measures must be based on a law that
is particularly precise.72 The ECtHR continues:
76. To ensure the effective implementation of the above principles,
the Court has developed the following minimum safeguards that
should be set out in statute law to avoid abuses: the nature of the
offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of
the categories of people liable to have their communications
monitored; a limit on the duration of such monitoring; the procedure
to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the
precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other
parties; and the circumstances in which data obtained may or must be
erased or the records destroyed.
64. Id. at 372, para. 90.
65. Id. at 374, para. 103.
66. Id. at 372, para. 92.
67. Sallinen, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 372, para. 93.
68. Id. at 367, para. 57.
69. Ass'n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 62540/00, paras. 76-77 (2007) (citations omitted).
70. See id.
71. Id. at para 75.
72. Id. at para 75.
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77. ... [I]n the context of secret measures of surveillance by public
authorities, because of the lack of public scrutiny and the risk of
misuse of power, the domestic law must provide some protection
against arbitrary interference with art 8 rights. The Court must be
satisfied that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against
abuse. This assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case,
such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the
grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to
permit, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy
provided by the national law.
73
When professional privilege is at stake, the ECtHR seems however to
demand for additional safeguards. In several judgments concerning
professional privilege the ECtHR expressed that supervision of the
surveillance should be done by an independent judge.74 In Niemietz v.
Germany the fact that the warrant was drawn in broad terms is mentioned
as an element of appreciation by the Court.75 A broadly formulated and
imprecise warrant exposes the confidentiality of materials protected
under professional secrecy to particular risks.76 In the case of Wieser and
Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria the distinction between general
and specific safeguards is clearly stated:
Elements taken into consideration are, in particular, whether the
search was based on a warrant issued by a judge and based on
reasonable suspicion, whether the scope of the warrant was
reasonably limited and-where the search of a lawyer's office was
concemed-whether the search was carried out in the presence of an
independent observer in order to ensure that materials subject to
professional secrecy were not removed.77
In this case the Court decided that there had been a violation although the
representative of the Bar was present during the search.78 The fact that
that representative was able to examine all written documents but not the
electronic data led the Court to the conclusion that there had been a
violation of Article 8 ECHR.79 The fact that the law or practice provides
for the presence of an independent observer is thus not enough. The
observer has to be able-from a practical standpoint-to operate an
73. Id. at paras. 76-77.
74. See, e.g., Sallinen v. Finland, App. No. 50882/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2007);
Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 (1999).
75. See Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 251-B Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, paras.
30, 37 (1992).
76. Id.
77. Wieser v. Austria, App. No.74336/01, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, 1353, para. 57
(2008).
78. Id. at 1354, para. 63.
79. Id.
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effective selection of materials protected by professional secrecy. Also
in Smirnov v. Russia the absence of independent observers is considered
as an element of appreciation of the proportionality of the interference
with Article 8 rights and is clearly distinct from the general safeguards
required for every citizen.80 Specific special safeguards to be taken into
consideration by the Court are: "a prohibition on removing documents
covered by lawyer-client privilege or supervision of the search by an
independent observer capable of identifying, independently of the
investigation team, which documents were covered by legal professional
privilege.",
8 1
In Aalmoes a.o. v. Netherlands-besides the role played by a
representative of the Bar-the existence of a complex legal framework
that is supposed to offer safeguards against violations of the professional
privilege was the major reason for the ECtHR to declare the application
inadmissible:
[T]he Court considers that it is clearly in the general interest that any
person who wishes to consult a lawyer should be free to do so under
conditions which favour full and uninhibited discussion. It is for this
reason that the lawyer-client relationship is, in principle, privileged.
The suggestion that information conveyed by or to a lawyer in the
latter's professional capacity is susceptible to interception,
particularly by criminal investigation authorities who may have a
direct interest in obtaining such information, is not in keeping with
the principles of confidentiality and professional privilege attaching
to relations between a lawyer and his or her clients. It is for this
reason that, in principle, lawyers have in their professional contacts
with clients a reasonable expectation of protection and respect for
their professional privacy.
In order to secure respect for this reasonable expectation, it is
therefore required that the interception of telecommunications be
subject to an adequate system of supervision. In this area, faced with
evolving and sophisticated technology and the possibility of human
error or abuse, the Court considers that it is in principle desirable to
entrust the supervisory control to a judge.
It notes that, under the Netherlands domestic rules, judicial
supervision takes place at various stages:
80. See Smirnov v. Russia, App. No. 71362/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 71362/01, para. 44
(2007).
81. Id. at para. 48 (citation omitted).
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- when the investigating judge authorises the public prosecutor to
issue an initial interception order and on each occasion when the
investigating judge authorises a prolongation thereof;
- when the public prosecutor seeks authorisation from the
investigating judge to add to the case file information not falling
within the ambit of the privilege of non-disclosure under Article 218
of the CCP, but which information has been conveyed to or by a
person enjoying the privilege of non-disclosure;
- when-a lawyer being the suspect-the public prosecutor seeks
authorisation from the investigating judge to add to the case file
information that has been identified by the public prosecutor-with
the assistance of the competent member of the local Bar
Association-as not falling within the ambit of the privilege of
non-disclosure; and,
- when the suspect is committed for trial, in the proceedings before
the trial court where an argument based on Article 359a of the CCP
can be raised, claiming that information falling within the ambit of
the privilege of non-disclosure had been unlawfully obtained and/or
unlawfully retained.
In the light of these considerations and its detailed examination of the
impugned legal rules on the interception of telecommunications, the
Court is of the opinion that the possible interference with the exercise
of the applicants' right to respect for private life and correspondence
in this field can reasonably be regarded as falling within the limits of
what is necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime,
as envisaged by Article 8 § 2.82
VIII.EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROTECTION OF PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
The question whether-and to what extent-the right to
confidentiality in the lawyer-client relationship can be submitted to
restrictions is another matter that has been discussed within the ECtHR.
Several decisions seem to admit some forms of restrictions and of
striking a balance between contradictory interests.
In the case of S. v. Switzerland, the applicant was detained.8 3 He
was not allowed to correspond freely with his lawyer; visits of the lawyer
took place under the supervision of a police official8 4  Three of the
82. Aalmoes v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16269/02 (2004).
83. See S. v. Switzerland, App. No. 13325/87, 220 Eur. H.R. Rep. 670 (1991).
84. Id. at 672, para. 15.
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applicant's letters to his lawyer were intercepted and were later used for
the purpose of graphological reports.85 On an appeal by the applicant,
the Zurich Court of appeal upheld the restrictions imposed upon the free
communication from the applicant with his lawyer with the following
consideration:
As the accused represented by Mr. Garbade and Mr. Rambert are
exercising their right to refuse to make any statements, one cannot
ignore the risk that defence counsel will not only co-ordinate their
tactical and legal way of proceeding but may also, intentionally or
not, adversely affect the ascertainment of the material truth. In these
circumstances, precisely in the case of offences of this type which
must be regarded as attacks on public and social order, there are
sufficient indications pointing to a danger of collusion in the person
of defence counsel.
86
Although the ECtHR decided that there had been violation of Article 6
ECHR, it also took the stand that not all restrictions to the confidentiality
of the lawyer-client communication can be rejected in principle:
49. The risk of "collusion" relied on by the Government does,
however, merit consideration....
Such a possibility, however, notwithstanding the seriousness of the
charges against the applicant, cannot in the Court's opinion justify
the restriction in issue and no other reason has been adduced cogent
enough to do so. There is nothing extraordinary in a number of
defence counsel collaborating with a view to co-ordinating their
defence strategy. Moreover, neither the professional ethics of Mr.
Garbade, who had been designated as court-appointed defence
counsel by the President of the Indictments Division of the Ziirich
Court of Appeal, nor the lawfulness of his conduct were at any time
called into question in this case.
87
Interesting is the discussion that developed within the Court as reflected
by a dissenting and a concurring opinion. In a separate opinion, Judge
Matscher said:
I voted with the majority in respect of the violation of Article 6(3)(b),
but I wish to make the following points:
85. Id.
86. Id. at 674, para. 24 (quoting Civil Division opinion).
87. Id. at 688-89, para. 49.
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1. I acknowledge that, in principle, it must be possible for a
defendant to communicate with his defence counsel freely and
without surveillance.
2. However, this is not an absolute principle; there are exceptional
situations where surveillance of the defendant's communications with
his counsel may be necessary and hence compatible with the
principle stated above. That this may be a real necessity is shown by
the not so infrequent cases of serious collusion between lawyers and
persons in custody which have occurred in several countries in recent
years.
My criticism of the reasoning of the present judgment is that it-
correctly-sets out the principle but-wrongly--does not explicitly
allow for the possibility of exceptions, which in my opinion is an
essential corollary of the principle, both being necessary in the
. . . . 88
interests of the proper administration of justice.
In a concurring opinion, in total opposition to the opinion of Judge
Matscher, Judge de Meyer stated:
I consider it advisable to emphasise that the freedom and inviolability
of communications between a person charged with a criminal offence
and his counsel are among the fundamental requirements of a fair
trial. They are inherent in the right to legal assistance and are
essential for the effective exercise of that right.
The same applies to communications between a lawyer and his
colleagues. It is perfectly legitimate for him to act in concert with
them. The fact that this may lead to a co-ordination of defence
strategy cannot-even or especially in the case of serious offences-
be used as a pretext for the restriction or surveillance of
communications between a lawyer and his client.
I do not think that there can be any exceptions to these principles.
89
In a terrorist case, Erdem v. Germany, the correspondence between
the detained applicant and his lawyer was monitored under powers
contained in Section 148(2) of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure.9" Section 148(2) reads:
88. S., 220 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 691 (Matscher, J., separate opinion).
89. Id. (de Meyer, J., concurring).
90. Erdem v. Germany, App. No. 38321/97, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2002).
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If the accused is in custody and the investigation concerns an offence
under Article 129a of the Criminal Code [membership of a terrorist
organisation], access to written or other documents must be refused
unless the sender agrees to their first being examined by a judge....
In cases in which correspondence has to be monitored... adequate
measures shall be taken to avoid written or other documents being
handed over at meetings between prisoners and their lawyers.
91
Section 148(a)(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that the judge with responsibility for such surveillance measures shall not
have part in, and may not be assigned to conduct of the investigation and
shall keep the information thus obtained confidential, unless it concerns a
serious or very serious offence.92 The ECtHR decided that professional
privilege could be set aside in these specific circumstances, striking a
balance between the necessity of combating terrorism and the protection
of individual rights:
68. The Court reiterates that some compromise between the
requirements for defending democratic society and individual rights
is inherent in the system of the Convention.
69. Having regard to the threat posed by terrorism in all its forms,
the safeguards attached to the monitoring of correspondence in the
instant case and the margin of appreciation afforded to the State, the
Court holds that the interference in issue was not disproportionate to
the legitimate aims pursued.
93
IX. PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE UNDER PRESSURE
Despite the protective measures prescribed by the ECtHR in it's
case law, in general the tendency in Europe in relation to the
confidentiality of lawyer client communications is towards erosion of the
protection.
The emphasis put on the fight against terrorism and organised crime
is largely responsible for this trend. The checks and balances that were
carefully built over the years, established a difficult equilibrium between
procedural safeguards necessary to guarantee a fair trial and the
ascertainment of the material truth. That balance is now sometimes
disrupted. Ascertainment of the material truth becomes a more
overriding interest especially in matters of organized and trans-border
crimes.
91. STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG [StPO] (CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE),
BUNDESGESETZBLATr [RGBI], I, 1074, as corrected on page 1319, § 148(2) (1987).
92. Id.
93. Erdem, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 398, paras. 68-69 (citations omitted).
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Legislation permitting new and very intrusive investigative methods
have been adopted in many European countries. 94 Large-scale phone
taps, secret searches of houses and premises, video and audio
observation, infiltration in criminal groups, and monitoring of email
exchanges have become part of the daily arsenal of police forces.95 Each
of these methods has consequences for the protection of the
confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients. Such
methods are often facilitated by new technologies allowing massive
surveillances. Phone taps for example are no longer recorded on a
magnetic tape, but are recorded on data carriers that can be "scanned"
later with modem software96.
The problem that arises for the professional privilege related to
phone taps in the Netherlands is an eloquent example. The law on
special investigative methods 97 allows phone taps and is used on a
massive scale in criminal investigations.98 All conversations on a tapped
phone are registered automatically.99 Conversations benefiting from the
privilege of non-disclosure should be destroyed. 00
94. See generally SUSPECTS IN EUROPE: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT THE INVESTIGATIVE
STAGE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Ed Cape et al. eds.,
Intersentia Antwerpen, Oxford 2007).
95. See id. at 41-43, 66-68, 86-87, 111-12, 136-37, 163-65, 188-90.
96. See KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (D.M. Wood
ed., 2006), available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data-
protection/practical_application/surveillance societyfullreport_2006.pdf, A.H.Vedder,
J.G.L. van der Wees, B. J. Koops en P. de Hert, Van privacyparadijs tot controlestaat?
Misdaad- en terreurbestrijding in Nederland aan bet begin van de 21 ste eeuw. Den Haag:
Rathenau Instituut, 2007; Studie 49.
97. Wet Bijzondere Opsporingsbevoegdheden, 1 Feb. 2000, Stb. 245.
98. See Memorandum from Hirsch Ballin, Minister of Justice to the Dutch
Parliament, nr. 5546537/08 (May 28, 2008), available at http://www.nrc.nl/binnenland/
article 1900270.ece/1.700_gesprekken-per -dag-afgetapt (stating that in the past half year
12,491 telephones were tapped in the course of criminal investigations which amounted
to an average of 1,681 telephone taps a day; one telephone tap may last from a few weeks
to several years).
99. See COLLEGE BESCHERMING PERSOONSGEGEVENS (PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
AUTHORITY), ONDERZOEK NAAR DE WAARBORGING VAN DE VERTROUWELIJKE
COMMUNICATIE VAN ADVOCATEN BIJ DE INTERCEPTIE VAN TELECOMMUNICATIE (2003),
available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads-rapporten/rap-2003_beroepsgeheim-
advocaten.pdf?refer=true&theme=purple.
100. Article 126aa, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van
Strafvordering--"CCP") provides:
2. To the extent that the written records or other objects contain information
conveyed by or to a person entitled to rely on the privilege of non-disclosure by
virtue of Article 218 [of the CCP] if he or she were to be questioned as a
witness about the contents of that information, these written records and other
objects shall be destroyed. Rules for this shall be given by Order in Council
(Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur).
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According to a formal step-by-step instruction to investigating
officers contained in the "Destruction of intercepted conversations with
persons enjoying the privilege of non-disclosure" issued by the Board of
Procurators General on 12 March 2002, intercepted telephone
conversations with lawyers are first transcribed by the police and are
then submitted to the prosecutor who orders the destruction of the
recordings if he considers that the privilege applies.' This entails that
both the police and the public prosecutor become aware of the contents
of each confidential communication between a lawyer and a client that
has been intercepted by means of an investigative power. This in itself
can be considered in breach of the attorney client privilege, because as a
consequence it is the prosecutor who decides whether the transcripts
should be destroyed or not and moreover he does so after reading the
information contained in privileged conversations. The police and the
prosecutor are then supposed to "forget" the information or at least to
make total abstraction of it during the further investigation. It is patently
obvious that no human brain could do so. Although this practice was
before the ECtHR in the aforementioned case of Aalmoes v. Netherlands,
the decision of the Court did not take into consideration the argument
that the very essence of professional privilege is abolished if the police
and the prosecutor are allowed to review confidential information before
ordering its destruction. 0 2 Practice in the Netherlands proved to be even
worse. Lawyers discovered transcripts of their conversations with clients
in the case file. A series of Court decisions in serious cases of organized
crime declared the prosecution inadmissible or excluded evidence
because in the course of the trial it appeared that the prosecutor had not
complied with the legal obligation to destroy privileged materials. 0 3 The
Public Prosecution Office promised to do better in the future but argued
at the same time that such "accidents" are inevitable and should be
"understood" in the light of the necessity to discover the truth in serious
criminal cases.
10 4
101. Memo from the Board of Procurators General on the Destruction of Intercepted
Conversations with Persons Enjoying the Privilege of Non-Disclosure (Mar. 12, 2002).
102. See generally Aalmoes v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16269/02 (2004).
103. Court of Appeals-Gravenhage, 9-2-2006, Nieuwsbrief Strafrecht 2006, 118;
District Court Amsterdam, 7-6-2006, www.rechtspraak.nl LJN: AX7135; District Courts-
Gravenhage 25-1-2007, www.rechtspraak.nl LJN: AZ7021; District Court Rotterdam 20-
2-2007, Nieuwsbrief Strafrecht 2007, 145; Court of Appeals-Gravenhage 3-4-2007,
www.rechtspraak.nl LJN:BA2127; Court of Appeal Amsterdam 20-6-2007,
www.rechtspraak.nl LJN: BA7722; Supreme Court 2-10-2007, Nieuwsbrief Strafrecht
2007, 389; District Courts-Gravenhage 7-12-2007, Nieuwsbrief Strafrecht 2007, 468;
Court of Appeal Amsterdam 13-2-2008, Nieuwsbrief Strafrecht 2008, 90.
104. See Written Reply of the Minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin (Jan. 28, 2008)
(addressing questions put to him in Parliament regarding the telephone tapping of
conversations with lawyers). Tweede Kamer 2007-2008 Aanhangsel van de
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Other sources of erosion of the protection of confidentiality are the
money laundering regulations. Directives to combat money laundering
have been adopted on the level of the European Union and transposed
into national law of the member states.
Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 December 2001,105 amending Council Directive
91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purpose of money laundering10 6 extends to lawyers the
obligation to inform the competent authorities of any suspicion of money
laundering imposed earlier upon financial institutions.'0 7 The 2001
Directive does contain some provisions supposed to protect professional
privilege. 10 8  However, several professional organizations of lawyers
criticized the vague character of these provisions.'0 9  Belgian bar
associations brought actions to the Belgian Arbitration Court (now
Constitutional Court) for the annulment of various articles of the law
transposing this directive into the Belgian legal order. The
Constitutional Court referred the case for a preliminary ruling to the
Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ)."I°
In the center of the debate before the ECJ was the nature of the
activities of lawyers that could benefit from the protection of
confidentiality: is mere advice, not related to any litigation, protected by
the privilege?"' The bar associations argued that all activities of lawyers
should benefit from the protection."l 2 If not, the right to a fair trial would
Handelingen, no.1048. In a speech to the annual meeting of the Dutch Bar Association
on 19 September 2008, the Chair of the Board of Procurators General and head of the
Public Prosecution Service admitted that it cannot be guaranteed that confidential
material will be always distroyed and urged the government to look for other ways to
protect privileged converstations.
105. Council Directive 2001/97, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EC).
106. Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (EC).
107. See Council Directive, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF THE BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION (CCBE), POSITION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (CCBE) ON THE REQUIREMENTS ON A LAWYER TO REPORT SUSPICIONS OF
MONEY LAUNDERING AND ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR A THIRD EU
DIRECTIVE ON MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS (2004), available at
http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/ccbe-position-paper 11 183
72265 1.pdf.
110. See Orde des barreaux francophones et germanophones a.o. v. Council of
Ministers, Belg. Const. Ct., Nrs. 3064 en 3065, (2008) (Belg.).
111. Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones v. the Council of Ministers,
C-305/05, 2007 E.J.C. (ruling in reference to a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC
from the Belgian Constitutional Court); Opinion of advocate general Poiares Maduro,
paras. 51-53 (Dec. 14, 2006).
112. Opinion of advocate general Poiares Maduro, supra note 111, para. 53.
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be endangered.' 13 The ECJ decided--evading the question whether mere
advice is covered by professional secrecy-that the Directive did not
violate the right to a fair trial, because it excluded precisely from the
obligation to inform the authorities, all activities related to litigation.'
14
The question referred to by the Belgian Constitutional Court did not
contain any reference to the right to privacy as a foundation of
professional privilege as a result of which the ECJ did not take this
aspect into consideration in its ruling.' 5  Before the Belgian
Constitutional Court, the scope of the discussion was broader and
included also matters such as the right to privacy." 6  The Belgian
Constitutional Court finally decided that all activities of lawyers, whether
related to litigation or not, should benefit from the protection of the
confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients." 7 In
other European countries, the question is still open.
In Spain, the implementation of money laundering directives led to
the seizure of all files of a lawyer's cabinet in the city of Marbella,
completely paralyzing the work of the lawyer and also the work of the
local court because one of the main law offices simply did not have
access to any of its clients' files."
18
X. FINAL REMARKS
It is important to keep in mind that there is no specific provision on
the protection of professional privilege in the ECHR and that the
protection of confidentiality of communications between lawyers and
clients remains primarily a matter of national law. Nevertheless, it can
be said that the ECtHR in general takes a protective stand on professional
privilege, even in the absence of an explicit text. The ECtHR referred in
a minority of cases to the fight to a fair trial as protected by Article 6 of
the ECHR in different of its aspects. The majority of the cases however
have been decided on the basis of Article 8 of the ECHR.
Although the protection of confidentiality can be considered as
being part of the principles and concepts common to the laws of the
European states, the absence of explicit Europe-wide binding legislation
has as a consequence that the mechanism established to protect the scope
113. Id.
114. Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones, C-305/05, paras. 17-19
(ruling in reference to a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Belgian
Constitutional Court).
115. Id.
116. Orde des barreaux francophones et germanophones a.o. v. Council of Ministers,
Belg. Const. Ct., Nrs. 3064 en 3065, (2008) (BeIg.).
117. Id.
118. Interviews with lawyers from the Malaga bar association to which Marbella
belongs (on file with authors).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
of the privilege vary significantly. This leads to serious differences in
the degree of protection, and also to serious differences in the
implementation of case law of the ECtHR with an impact on privilege.
Furthermore, national legislative developments as well new
European legislation and regulations in relation to the fight against
organized crime and terrorism have a negative influence on the
protection of attorney client privilege. Generally, the balance is moving
more in favor of the ascertainment of the material truth than in favor of
the procedural safeguards guaranteeing a fair trial.
As long as there is no explicit provision protecting professional
privilege to which the ECtHR can refer, it is preferable that cases
involving professional privilege would be examined systematically under
the right to protection of privacy as well as under the right to a fair trial.
As the ECtHR stated itself in the case of Niemietz v. Germany,
"encroachment on professional secrecy may have repercussions on the
proper administration of justice."' 19
Article 8 of the Convention allows for a balance between competing
interests. The level of protection offered by Article 6 of the Convention
is higher because it does not provide for exceptions, such as measures
necessary in a democratic society or in the interest of public security.
The concept of "fair trial," in itself serves, after all, the interest of a
democratic society. In the light of the stress put on the protection of
legal professional privilege as a result of "crime fighting" policies, it
would however be preferable to avoid such a "detour" and to adopt-in
the framework of an additional protocol to the ECHR-a text explicitly
protecting the lawyer client privilege. Sources of inspiration for such a
text could be Article 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (annexed to Resolution (73) 5 of the Committee
of Ministers), as well as the European Agreement Relating to Persons
Participating in Proceedings of the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights mentioned above. Many member states of the Council of
Europe signed these texts, which should facilitate the negotiation to
include them in an additional protocol to the ECHR. However, the
clearest text that provides for the best protection is the American
Convention on Human Rights, which states in Article 8 § 2.4 the right of
the accused to "defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal
counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately
with his counsel. 12°
119. Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 251-B Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, para. 37
(1992).
120. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8 § 2.4, 1144
U.N.T.S.123, 9 I.L.M. 673.
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The adoption of a common text would not impede on the right of
member states to develop their own mechanisms of protection of
confidentiality of lawyer client communication. The present situation in
which the national laws on this matter vary significantly should therefore
not be an argument not to adopt such a text. The purpose of such a text
would not be uniformity, but rather the setting of minimum standards
that could be applied and developed in the case law of the ECtHR.

